An article in the August 21st 2010 edition of the Economist, 'Fixing the Unfixable', describes in colorful detail the challenges facing the American effort to create a cohesive Afghan National Army (ANA). The article makes the argument that a capable ANA is a prerequisite to Western forces leaving the country, if the Afghan government is to be spared collapse. In making its case, the article draws attention to different aspects of the ANA's situation, which reeks of amateurism from top to bottom.
While credible reports as to the the Afghan National Army and Police's moral corruption abound, whether it be the routine torture of detainees or the pedophilic practice of bachabazi, the Economist provides insightful data as to the actual capability of the ANA, or lack thereof. The article cites a report released earlier this year by Arnold Fields, the US inspector general for Afghan reconstruction, which says that only 23% of ANA soldiers and 12% of police can be trusted to work unsupervised. Senior officers are known to be stealing food and fuel, and are accused of stealing weapons. Certainly the capability of the ANA to govern itself and command respect from its own members is under serious question.
As to the ANA's capability in the field, the Economist presents some interesting numbers: "During operations, they remain almost totally reliant on NATO troops, who suffer twice as many casualties." The image this conjures is one of ANA troops taking full cover at first sign of the Taliban, before calling in Western forces to clean up the mess. An episode is described where, without the operational support of NATO, 300 ANA soldiers managed to get themselves ambushed by the Taliban in Laghman. A quick look into this story, reported in the Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2010, tells that the ANA commando units, such as the one defeated in the ambush "are supposed to be the force's best units." Many were killed and captured and the unit was "missing" according to the words of Gen. Zahir Azimi of the Afghan Defense Ministry.
Another concern raised by the Economist is over the ANA's sustainability and identity as a 'National' army. "Less than 3% of recuits to the ANA are from the Pushtun south, from where the Taliban draw most support." This is a huge discrepancy, as the Pushtuns are the largest ethnic group within Afghanistan. Apparently translators are often required not just for NATO officers, but also for ANA officers when operating in Pushtun districts, where most of the insurgency is being fought. That the makeup of the ANA is being drawn along the same divisive ethnic and tribal lines as the rest of Afghanistan is a concern to many as to the viability of the ANA, as to who the ANA truly represents and is willing to defend, and as to whether or not the ANA can help avoid a civil war after Western forces leave, or whether it would infact help precipitate one.
The article mentions that Army pay has been increased from $120 to $165 a month. While this is apparently good pay in Afghanistan, it does raise the question of motivation. To speculate, it would seem likely that in such a poor and divided country, with no national military tradition, it is the pay and the pay alone that motivates recruits to keep coming back. In combat, as we have seen, the ANA forces seem to shrink from confrontation, which may be a sign that ANA soldiers show up to work to get paid, not to risk their necks. In many cases the pay does not seem to be enough, as the ANA's desertion rate is astronomical. A Nov. 26, 2009 article in the Asia Times cites an Inspector General for reconstruction report revealing that one in every four combat soldiers quit the ANA during the year ending in September 2009.
The Economist discusses all of these problems in the context of their appraisal and addressing by General William Caldwell, who upon recently taking charge of organising the ANA, is reported as "horrified" that the focus was on "quantity, not quality". Horrifying perhaps, but unsurprising that priorities at the ANA are out of place. That much is already evident. But the type of training received by many recruits may also have spoken to them about the nature and strength of the West's commitment to the ANA. Caldwell reports that "The ratio of instructors to students was 1 to 80... On one base, it was 1 to 466 - There were no training standards... It was just, eight weeks and you're done." It may have seemed to many recruits that the type of Army they were joining was one of appearances. "Some contractors failed even to show recruits how to calibrate the sights on their weapons" the article reports. With this being the level of preparation, losses in the field and desertion in the ANA ranks seems to find context.
To learn that contractors are responsible for the dismal type of training given to ANA recruits is to consider another aspect which puts the viability of not only the ANA, but the entire mission into question. While the profit motive is ever present in any military adventure, and particularly American ones, in this instance it has undermined its objectives. It is astounding that such an integral part of the American strategy for reconstruction, the training of an effective national army, could be commoditised and offered up for contract, and then to be administered privately and with such little oversight. It leaves one to question the administration of the entire operation, and where else profit motives are being allowed to hinder the objectives of the Afghan mission.
Perhaps General Caldwell may find it more horrifying, the prospect of forming a credible modern army out of an ill-equipped ragtag group of illiterate peasants, pedophiles, corrupt officers and amateurs with mixed loyalties, ill-trained by foreigners more interested in making a quick buck than in the future of Afghanistan. Perhaps he is deluded: his goal is to expand the army from 134,000 to 171,600 over the next 12 months. This would represent an increase of some 37,000 soldiers, which is as much as the ANA has grown in the last 5 years when the focus was on "quantity, not quality". These numbers are pie in the sky, as much as the mission is itself.
That such an army, divided against itself, could ever prop up a national government seems a far away prospect. Indeed the ANA appears to be something of a joke, and an army more in name than in reality.
Read the Economist article at http://www.economist.com/node/16846714
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